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Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the
Myth of Precontractual Reliance
ROBERT E. SCOTT*
For decades there has been substantial uncertainty regarding when the law
will impose precontractual liability. The confusion is partly attributable to
the unfortunate case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and to the unusual
degree of scholarly attention that it has attracted. A careful examination of
the record of the Hoffman case reveals facts that are much different from
conventional understanding. The disagreement between Joseph Hoffman and
Red Owl Stores resulted from a fundamental misunderstanding between the
parties regarding the terms of Hoffnan's capital contribution to the
franchise. The misunderstanding was largely a product of Hoffnan's
penchant for moving assets around during the negotiation period, his failure
to clarify the terms of his $18,000 capital investment, and the "no debt"
condition attached to loans from his father-in-law. These facts show that
neither promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment,
or a failure to negotiate in good faith would have been a proper ground for
imposing liability on Red Owl Stores. This result is consistent with a
systematic survey of the case law showing that courts overwhelmingly
decline to impose liability for representations made during preliminary
negotiations. The preoccupation with reliance on preliminary negotiations
has led scholars to ignore an important recent development in the law. A
number of modern courts now impose a duty to bargain in good faith when
parties make reliance investments following a "preliminary agreement" in
which the parties agree to some terms but leave others open for further
negotiation. Professor Scott argues that lawyers and academic
commentators should turn their attention away from the Hoffman paradigm
and instead focus on key issues that the contemporary cases have yet to
resolve: when have parties reached sufficient agreement to trigger the duty to
negotiate further in good faith, and precisely what does that duty entail?
I. INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom among contemporary scholars is that courts
sometimes will impose promissory estoppel liability for reliance investments
undertaken prior to any agreement between commercial parties.' Evidence of
* Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia University. This essay benefited
greatly from comments by Ken Abraham, Douglas Baird, George Cohen, Marvin
Chirelstein, Victor Goldberg, Jody Kraus, Alan Schwartz, and George Triantis. It is
reprinted in CONTRACT STORIES (Douglas Baird, ed., Foundation Press) (forthcoming
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1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1981) ("Bad faith in
negotiations... may be subject to sanctions."); RALPH B. LAKE & UGO DRAETTA, LETTERS
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promises made and relied upon during the negotiation process together with a
"general obligation arising out of the negotiations themselves" are the
supposed grounds for imposing liability even for preliminary negotiations that
ultimately break down.2 But even a casual survey of contemporary case law
casts significant doubt on the accuracy of the conventional view. Courts
actually make some form of agreement a necessary pre-condition to a
promisee's recovery. The real issues are: When will a preliminary agreement
be found? And how does the nature of such agreement determine when and
how a promisee can recover?
These questions have generated a literal flood of litigation that has been
virtually ignored in contemporary contract and commercial law courses. The
reason that this question is ignored in commercial law is that commercial law
courses only teach cases that are decided under one or more provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code and yet many commercial law issues, such as this
one, require one to exit the Code via section 1-103 and invoke the common
law of contracts. One reason that this question is ignored in Contracts classes
is because of the misplaced attention given to the decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.3 As a consequence of a
fundamental misunderstanding of the law in action, lawyers bring suits
claiming reliance on preliminary negotiations and, to their surprise and that of
their clients, they lose. Meanwhile, an entire new body of law enforcing
certain preliminary agreements has emerged unbeknownst to most lawyers
(and legal academics).
The story of this misunderstanding of the law of precontractual liability
begins with Hoffman. In Hoffman, the court held that even if two parties had
never reached agreement on essential factors necessary to establish a contract,
a party who relied on representations made during the negotiations could
recover sunk costs based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel as expressed
in Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts.4 Under this doctrine, the court
held that a "promise"-here Red Owl's representation that $18,000 was
OF INTENT AND OTHER PRECONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS 177 (1994) ("Liability for action
during the precontractual stage of a transaction may be based on the obligation to bargain
and to negotiate in good faith."); E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217,
222 (1987) ("In recent decades, courts have shown increasing willingness to impose
precontractual liability."); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of
Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 472,
496-97 (1983) ("It is clear that promissory estoppel has been used to enforce promises too
indefinite or incomplete to constitute offers.").
2 See supra sources cited in note 1.
3 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
4 Id. at 274-75.
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sufficient capital to secure a franchise-need not be as definite in its terms as a
promise that is the basis of a traditional bargain contract.5
Putting aside for the moment the dubious accuracy of that holding as a
matter of contract doctrine, one fact has become clear in the intervening years
during which time Hoffman has been ensconced as a favorite in Contracts
casebooks 6 and analyzed in numerous law review articles: 7 Hoffman is an
outlier; the case has not been followed in its own or other jurisdictions. 8
Indeed, a recent case applying the Wisconsin law that governed Hoffman
refused to award reliance damages on a promissory estoppel claim under
similar facts.9 Courts in other jurisdictions have established strict limitations
5 1d.
6 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 732 (3d ed. 2003);
JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, CONTRACTS:
CASES & COMMENT 409 (8th ed. 2003); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG &
CAROL SANGER, CONTRACTS: CASES & MATERIALS 235 (6th ed. 2001); STEWART
MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 390 (2d
ed. 2003); EDWARD J. MURPHY, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT
LAW 435 (6th ed. 2003); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND
THEORY 204 (rev. 3d ed. 2003); LON TULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC
CONTRACT LAW 573 (7th ed. 2001).
7 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN L.
REV. 481, 495, 504-05 (1996); Gregory M. Duhl, Red Owl's Legacy, 87 MARQ. L. REV.
297 (2004); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract
Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 909 n.22 (1985); E. Allan
Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and
Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217,236-38 (1987); Jay M. Feinman, Promissory
Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 694 (1984); Mark P. Gergen,
Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 27-42 (1990); Jason
Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of
Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 496-99 (1999); Avery Katz, When Should an
Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105
YALE L.J. 1249, 1255-56 (1996); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 686-90 (1969); Juliet P. Kostritsky, When Should Contract Law
Supply a Liability Rule or Term?, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1283, 1322-23 (2000); Peter Linzer,
Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 WiS. L.
REV. 695, 717-20; Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of
Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472,
524-25 (1983); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith " in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 223-25 (1968); Edward
Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 11, 142-44
(1991).
8 Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 237-38.
9 Beer Capitol Distrib., Inc. v. Guinness Bass Imp. Co., 290 F.3d 877, 880-81 (7th Cir.
2002). The court denied both promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims based on
the plaintiff's reliance on defendant's representation during the negotiations that he would
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for imposing promissory liability based on representations made during the
negotiation process. 10
All of this begs for answers to several key questions: How could the court
in Hoffman find liability where so many other courts could not? And, what
exactly is the law of contracts in the muddy area of precontractual liability? In
this essay, I begin with a close look at the Hoffman case. The transcript of the
trial reveals a story far different from the conventional understanding of the
dispute between Joseph Hoffman and the representatives of Red Owl Stores. 11
The truth suggests an important lesson for law teachers (and law students): It is
dangerous to draw inferences about emerging doctrine from isolated cases,
and it helps to read cases systematically if one wishes to recover the law in
action. By setting the record straight on what really happened in Hoffman and
pointing where the legal rules governing preliminary agreements have evolved
in the years since the case was decided, I hope to encourage a more systematic
approach to the "discovery" of new legal doctrines.
II. THE TRUE FACTS OF HOFFMAN V. RED OWL STORES
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin relied on an edited transcript of the trial
as the basis for its decision. 12 But the complete trial transcript of the case 13
paints a very different picture of the relationship between Joseph Hoffman 14
recommend the plaintiff as the exclusive distributor of defendant's beer for southeastern
Wisconsin. Id.
10 See, e.g., Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento v. Citibank, No. 03-1537, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23062, at *18-23 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2003); R.G. Group, Inc. v. The Horn &
Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1984).
11 Commentators have been virtually unanimous in accepting the story, as told by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, that Red Owl's escalating financial demands were the
proximate cause of the breakdown in negotiations between the parties. Marvin Chirelstein
is a notable exception to this uncritical view of the case in suggesting that there is a
plausible alternative story to tell about Hoffman. MARviN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND
CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 57-58 (5th ed. 2006); see also Johnston, supra
note 7, at 496-99.
12 See Brief of the Appellants, Appendix at 101-241, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.
and Edward Lukowitz, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (No. 147) [hereinafter "Appellant's
Brief'].
13 Transcript of Record at 77, Joseph and Shirley Hoffmann v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.
and Edward Lukowitz (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (No. 14954) (A.W.
Parnell, J.) [hereinafter Record].
14 Joseph Hoffmann in fact spelled his name with two "N"s, thus "Hoffmann," and it
was so spelled in the trial transcript and in respondents' brief to the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. See Record, supra note 13, at 77 ("Your name is Joseph Hoffmann, is that
correct?" Answer: "That's right, sir." Question: "Spelled Hoffman?" Answer: "Two
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and Edward Lukowitz and the other Red Owl agents headquartered in
Minneapolis. 15 This is true even if one endeavors to interpret all facts in the
light most favorable to Hoffman, as the appellee holding a jury verdict.
The key to unraveling the true story behind Hoffman is to ignore the red
herring. Specifically, let's put to one side a consideration of the various actions
taken by Hoffman in reliance on statements made by Lukowitz and the other
Red Owl representatives during the negotiation process. Rather, let's focus on
a single fact. Hoffman claimed to have "about $18,000" available to be set up
in a Red Owl franchise. 16 This much is conceded by all. These, then, are the
pertinent questions: What was the understanding as to the composition of the
$18,000? Was it supposed to be all equity, or was it to be cash composed of
some equity and some debt? If the latter, from what sources was Hoffman to
obtain his encumbered cash? Finally, how reasonable was Red Owl's reaction
to the changing sources of Hoffman's prospective $18,000 contribution as he
moved his assets around between September 1961 and January 1962? While
these financing questions are complex, they contain the answer to the puzzle
that has perplexed students and commentators for years: What explains the
behavior of Red Owl officials who, according to the court, repeatedly
increased Hoffman's minimum capital requirements, first from $18,000 to
$24,000, then to $26,000, and ultimately to $34,000?
A. The Purchase and Sale of the Wautoma Grocery Store and the
$18,000 "Assurance"
In the fall of 1959, Joseph Hoffman was restless. He had operated a bakery
in Wautoma, Wisconsin since 1956, but he wanted to do more.17 So, in
November 1959, Hoffman contacted Sid Jansen, the Division Manager of Red
Owl Stores, 18 and inquired about the possibility of acquiring a Red Owl
'N's."). The majority opinion of Justice Currie in the Supreme Court misspelled his name
and the misspelling has remained ever since. See Record, supra note 13, at 78.
15 As I suggest in this essay, the misunderstanding between the parties that led to the
dispute cannot be appreciated if one merely reads the edited transcript. Moreover, Red
Owl's attorneys did a poor job of highlighting the key facts and their legal relevance either
at trial or on appeal.
16 Record, supra note 13, at 86.
17 Hoffman had done well in this business and, in February 1959, he had bought the
building in which the bakery was located for $10,000 under an installment land contract
($100 down and $100 per month). See Record, supra note 13, at 79-81. By September
1961, when he paid off this mortgage, he had paid down the principal liability to about
$7500. See infra note 39.
18 Jansen's responsibilities included "future development" (finding new franchisees
and facilitating the process by which they could begin operations as a Red Owl franchisee).
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franchise store. Informal discussions continued but without much progress and,
by the fall of 1960, Edward Lukowitz had taken over for Jansen as Division
Manager. Around Christmas that year Hoffman had an idea. He thought "it
might be a good idea to get a little experience in the grocery business before I
go into a bigger store." 19 A friend in Wautoma who was running such a store
had suffered a heart attack and the store was available. He called Lukowitz
who looked into it and advised him to go ahead. 20
Hoffman bought the Wautoma grocery store business from his friend for
$16,000 in February 1961 and assumed the lease on the building.21 Things
went well even though Hoffman was stretched thin in managing both the
bakery and the grocery business at the same time. In May, Lukowitz and
another Red Owl employee came to the store to conduct an inventory, and they
concluded that the store was running a three to four percent profit, which they
judged as pretty good under the circumstances. 22 Lukowitz thereupon urged
Hoffman to sell the business to his assistant, Edward Wrysinski, in order to
free up his equity for the larger Red Owl store. Hoffman was reluctant to sell in
June because the summer business in the lake country was historically very
brisk (an estimated 5000 tourists would increase the summer population
significantly). 23
At this meeting in May 1961, Hoffman said to Lukowitz and his colleague,
"Fellows, you know how much money I got-about $18,000. Will this put me
in a bigger operation or won't it?" 24 Lukowitz replied that there would be no
problem with that level of investment. 25 There was, however, no discussion
then (or at any time thereafter) as to the nature of the $18,000 investment. Was
it to be all equity, or was it to be part equity and part borrowed cash? 26
19 Record, supra note 13, at 84.
20 Id.
21 Hoffman paid $7000 for the business and $9000 for the inventory, and leased the
store building for $175 per month. Record, supra note 13, at 89. Hoffman's cost in
acquiring and operating the grocery business in Wautoma was $18,000. Id. at 90. He
financed this transaction in part by borrowing $9500 from the Union State Bank of
Wautoma and giving the bank a chattel mortgage on his bakery equipment. Exhibit 41,
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21,
1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.).
22 Record, supra note 13, at 85, 95.
23 id. at 87-88.
24 Id. at 86.
25 There also was evidence that Hoffman and Wrysinski were not working well
together and that this might have been a contributing factor in the decision to sell. Id. at 119.
Though conflicting, the evidence is sufficient to find that Lukowitz urged this move so as
to "set Hoffman up" in a bigger Red Owl store.
26 On cross-examination, Hoffman was asked, "Was there any discussion at any time
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Hoffman clearly assumed it was the latter. He had no intention of selling his
bakery business in order to free up equity for the new franchise. Rather, he
hoped to continue that business and operate the new Red Owl Store at the same
time.27 He was thinking of putting together $18,000 in cash consisting of his
current banked savings of about $10,500 and a $7500 loan from his
father-in-law, Simon Vanden Heuvel, a prosperous local farmer.28
Red Owl, on the other hand, regarded a substantial equity contribution
from Hoffman as the key to a successful franchise.29 Indeed, Red Owl officials
had reason to believe that Hoffman had more than enough equity to establish a
franchise. On September 11, 1961, Hoffman had provided a financial
statement to Lukowitz that was passed on to the home office in Minneapolis.
This statement represented that Hoffman had business equity of at least
$28,000, consisting of $10,000 in cash, $1500 in inventory in the bakery,
$4500 equity in the bakery building, and $12,000 equity in his bakery
equipment.30 Thus, from Red Owl's perspective, Hoffman would have ample
equity, provided he liquidated his bakery business.
The Wautoma grocery store was sold to Ed Wrysinski on June 6, 1961 for
$18,000.31 At the time he sold in June, many details about establishing
Hoffman in a bigger store were unresolved, including which town would be
the best location for the new store, the size and site of the store building,
fixtures needed for a store, etc. 32 Shortly afterward, Lukowitz suggested
as to how this $18,000 was to be made up? That is, was it all unencumbered cash or partly
to be borrowed cash?" Hoffman answered: "I don't believe there was any discussion on
that." Id. at 167.
2 7 Id. at 133-34.
28 See Hoffman's financial statement of September 11, 1961. Exhibit 40, Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W.
Pamell, J.).
29 Equity participation helps to align the interests of a franchisee with those of the
franchisor. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
30 See Exhibit 40, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct.,
Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Pamell, J.). The financial statement is dated
September 11, 1961. Although the statement also reflects a $6000 equity in his residence in
Wautoma, there was never any indication that personal, as opposed to business, assets were
to be contributed to the franchise.
31 Hoffman testified that it was his decision to sell the store business but that he acted
on Lukowitz's advice that he should sell before the summer tourist season in order to
prepare for the new store. Hoffman testified: "I told Ed that the fellow that was working for
me was interested in the business. Ed says: Let's sell it to him now and go into a bigger
operation." Record, supra note 13, at 94.
32 On cross-examination Hoffman was asked, "Didn't you know at this time that in
[selling the Wautoma store and] establishing a bigger store there would be a lot of things to
be worked out?" "That's right," Hoffman replied. Id. at 171.
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alternative locations for the new store-Lake Mills, Clintonville, Kewaunee,
and Chilton. The two of them traveled around looking at these places and
finally settled on a lot in Chilton. 33 On August 3, Hoffman acquired a
thirty-day option to purchase the Chilton lot for a price of $6000 with $1000
down on exercise of the option.34 The plan was that Hoffman would purchase
the lot and then resell it at a profit to the contractor who was building the new
store, taking back a lease at a rental that reflected the enhanced price the
builder agreed to pay. 35 In essence, the sale/leaseback was designed both to
capture equity in the lot and to serve as an indirect loan from the builder to
Hoffman. The goal was to open the new store by December 1.
B. The September 2 7 Proposed Financing Plan
Based on Hoffman's September 11, 1961 financial statement, 36 it
appeared to Red Owl officials that, by selling the bakery building and business
and combining the proceeds with cash on hand, Hoffman would have $26,500
in liquid assets, more than enough to make his equity contribution to the
franchise operation. Hoffman, as we have seen, had much different intentions,
however. He did not intend to sell the equipment or the bakery building.
Rather, he wanted to lease the building and business to someone else and take
some of the equipment to operate a bakery in the new store. Hoffman saw the
bakery business as his livelihood, available to support his wife and six children
while getting started in the new store. 37
On September 13, acting on Lukowitz's advice, Hoffman paid the $1000
and exercised his option on the Chilton lot. Hoffman was eager to do so in any
event because he had heard of the possibility of an A&P acquiring the same
property for a store in Chilton. The next day, Hoffman paid off the $7500
mortgage on the bakery building, reducing his cash on hand in the bank to
$2500. On September 27, Lukowitz called Hoffman and arranged for him to
meet two people from the Red Owl home office-Herman Carlson, the future
development manager, and Walter Hall, the credit manager-at the lot in
33 Id. at 97-98.
34 The option was subsequently extended to September 15. Id. at 104.
35 Id. at 100.
36 The statement showed $10,000 cash in the bank and additional equity in the bakery
business of $16,500, consisting of the bakery building (worth $12,000 with a $7500
mortgage) and equipment (worth $19,500 subject to a chattel mortgage of $7500). See
Exhibit 40, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County,
Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.). Apparently, this financial statement was prepared at
Lukowitz's request.
37 Record, supra note 13, at 117.
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Chilton.38 During that meeting, Hoffman gave Carlson a second financial
statement which listed the bakery building as worth $12,000 and clear of liens
together with cash in hand of $2500. 39 Based on that statement, the parties
prepared the first "proposed financing plan." 40 It showed Hoffman making an
$18,600 equity contribution, consisting of $3600 cash, $12,000 from the sale
of the bakery building, and $3000 from the resale of the lot to the builder.4'
Also listed under "Other trade payables" was a loan from Hoffman's
father-in-law of $7500, designated as "pay interest only at 5%." Hoffman's
equity interest in the bakery equipment and the bakery merchandise was
indicated in a note on the proposal under "Bakery" but these assets were not
part of Hoffman's proposed equity contribution for the new store. It thus
appears from this first proposed plan that Red Owl assumed that the bakery
would be a separate operation run by Hoffman out of the franchise store.42
At the end of this meeting, someone said: "There seems to be no hitch,"
and the parties left in an optimistic frame of mind.43 Several days later,
Lukowitz called Hoffman, telling him to "get your money together." 44 During
this phone conversation, Lukowitz reiterated that the only remaining issue was
the sale of the bakery business and building (presumably to realize the $12,000
in cash as per the September 27 financing plan). While Hoffman had preferred
38 One reason to meet at the lot was to examine the map of the site and gauge its
relationship to "downtown" Chilton. Exhibit 29, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No.
14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.).
39 Recall that on September 14, Hoffman had paid off the $7500 mortgage on the
bakery building. This reduced his cash in the bank from $10,000 to $2500. Exhibit 38,
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21,
1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.).
40 See Exhibit 39, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct.,
Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.). Record, supra note 13, at 103-04.
41 Hoffman's contribution to the business was designated on the statement as "Equity
capital: Amount owner has to invest." Exhibit 39, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No.
14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.). Based on this
first financial proposal, it appears that both Red Owl and Hoffman understood that
Hoffman would put in $18,600 of his own cash exclusive of any borrowed funds from his
father-in-law.
42 A key question, of course, was whether Hoffman mentioned during this meeting
with Carlson and Hall his understanding that $18,000 was a sufficient contribution to
establish a franchise and his understanding that he could make this contribution partly with
cash and partly with borrowed money from his father-in-law. During cross-examination
Hoffman was asked: "Did you mention your $18,000 understanding to Carlson and Hall
when filling out your financial statement?" He answered, "I can't recall." Record, supra
note 13, at 179.
43 Id. at 109.
44 Id. at 230.
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to lease the business minus enough equipment to have a bakery in the new
store, he nonetheless agreed to sell the business if that was a necessary
condition to obtaining the franchise.
C. The November 22 Proposed Financing Plan
On October 11, 1961 Hoffman returned to the Union State Bank and
borrowed $13,500 secured by a further $6000 chattel mortgage on the bakery
equipment and a $7500 mortgage on the bakery building.45 Hoffman left the
bank with $13,500 in cash.46 This amount was augmented a month later when
Hoffman sold the bakery building for $10,000, using $7500 of the proceeds to
retire the mortgage and retaining $2500 in cash.47 Thus, as of November 6,
Hoffman had over $18,000 in cash equity although his net worth had declined
slightly given the lower than expected sale price for the bakery building. Most
of his cash ($13,500) was borrowed against his equity in the bakery equipment.
Thereafter, Hoffman took a job working nights at the Elm Tree Bakery. 48
Just before Thanksgiving, Lukowitz called to invite Hoffman to
Minneapolis to iron out final details with the home office financial folks so as
to get the store in operation after the first of the year. Hoffman met with
Lukowitz, Carlson, Hall, and their boss, Frank Walker, in Minneapolis around
November 22. At that meeting, the parties prepared a new financing proposal
based on a new financial statement that Hoffman prepared and signed.49 This
new plan provided that Hoffman would contribute about $22,000 in equity
consisting of $12,500 in cash ($4500 in savings plus $8000 from the Chilton
Bank secured by the bakery equipment) together with the bakery equipment.
Because the equipment was worth $18,000, it represented an in-kind capital
45 Exhibit 42, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie
County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.). (There is no copy of this mortgage in the record).
The previous day, October 10, Red Owl officials had shown Hoffman a floor plan they had
prepared of a proposed store in Chilton.
46 Thus, as of October 11, Hoffman had $16,000 in cash equity. When asked on
cross-examination about his timing in paying off the prior mortgage on the bakery building
on September 14 and creating a new one less than one month later, Hoffman stated that he
got the cash in response to Lukowitz's statement that he should get his money together in
anticipation of consummating the deal. Record, supra note 13, at 182.
47 He also guaranteed the lease to his top baker Michael Grimm at $120 per month. Id.
at 137.
48 Id. at 138. Presumably, Hoffman still had $18,000 in cash on hand at that time.
49 This new financial statement is not in the record. But based on the financing plan
that the parties then concluded, it appears that Hoffman had in the interim period retired
most or all of the $13,500 chattel mortgage on the bakery equipment owed to the Union
State Bank, thereby reducing his cash on hand to $4500.
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contribution to the business of about $10,000.50 In essence, the deal now
proposed that the residual value of the bakery equipment become a major
component of his contribution to the franchise. It replaced the previous plan to
raise $12,000 in cash from the sale of the bakery building; an asset that
Hoffman previously had listed as free from liens.
Shortly after the meeting, Hoffman received a copy of the November
financing proposal in a letter from Carlson, the credit manager. In the letter,
Carlson explained the changes from the previous plan: "You will find enclosed
a report indicating our capital requirements. You will recall that in your visit to
the office that our original thinking on this was subsequently revised in order
to properly reflect the amount of equity capital that you personally have for
investment." 51 The problem, in essence, was that the sale of the bakery
building yielded less than was predicted and, moreover, contrary to Hoffman's
initial representations, the building had been mortgaged. 52 When it became
clear that the building was not unencumbered and thus could not provide a
major portion of Hoffman's equity contribution, the financing plan had to be
revised. After some reflection, Hoffman agreed to this revised proposal.53
Throughout this period, while Red Owl was interested in tying down
Hoffman's equity contribution, Hoffman was concerned about an entirely
different issue. Rather than focusing on how much equity he was putting into
the operation, he was focused on the amount of cash, whether encumbered or
unencumbered, that he was required to "contribute." Consequently, he
considered this November proposal to require an additional $6000 in cash
50 Exhibit 32, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie
County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.). The plan called for Hoffman to contribute
"equity capital" of $4600 in cash and $17,000 in bakery equipment (now clear of liens).
The plan again proposed that Hoffman would borrow $7500 from his father-in-law, still on
a "no pay, interest at 5%" basis. In addition, the "profit" on the resale of the lot was
increased to $4000, and Hoffman was to borrow an additional $8000 from the Union State
Bank in Chilton to be secured by the bakery equipment (thereby turning some of his equity
in the equipment into cash). The parties must have agreed that Hoffman would use $13,500
of his cash to retire the chattel mortgage on the bakery equipment (that would leave him
with about $4500 in cash as per the proposed financing plan).
51 Record, supra note 13, at 144-45. This statement by Carlson reflects the realization
on the part of the Red Owl financial people that Hoffman could raise $18,000 in cash
equity only by committing his equipment to the enterprise. They had initially thought,
based on the September 27th financial statement, that Hoffman had business equity of
$28,000 ($2500 cash + $12,000 bakery building + $13,500 equity in equipment and
inventory). But the November financial statement showed business equity of only $22,100
($4600 cash + $17,500 bakery equipment).
52 Id. at 180.
53 Id. at 102.
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beyond his original $18,000 commitment. 54 He reached that conclusion by
adding together the $7500 loan from his father-in-law, plus his cash
contribution of $4600, plus the $8000 loan from the Chilton bank secured by
the bakery equipment, plus the $4000 profit on the lot. This conclusion reflects
Hoffman's basic misunderstanding of the economics of the transaction;55 a
misunderstanding that began with the first proposed financing plan, continued
through the November meeting, and ultimately was the proximate cause of the
deal breaking down the following February.
In retrospect, the source of the misunderstanding following the November
meeting seems clear. Hoffman believed he was making an additional $6000
cash "contribution," while the Red Owl people believed that the equity
Hoffman had available to contribute was $6000 less than he had originally
represented. Throughout the negotiations in Minneapolis and thereafter, Red
Owl officials expressed concern that, of the $24,000 to $26,000 that Hoffman
was planning to contribute, only $13,000 was equity (free cash and amounts
borrowed against his equity in the bakery equipment).56 The balance was to be
borrowed unsecured from Hoffman's father-in-law and the building
contractor.
D. The December Financing Proposal
Shortly after the November meeting, Lukowitz called Hoffman and asked
to meet him at the Red Owl store in Appleton. Lukowitz had a wire from
Carlson stating that they needed to raise an additional $2000 for marketing and
promotion of the new store. Hoffman replied, "I have to find out if I can make
$2000 more available."'57 Several days later, Hoffman talked the situation over
with his wife and his father-in-law. They hit upon a solution to Hoffman's
evident problems in coming up with the needed financing: Hoffman and
54 Id. at 141-44.
55 Hoffman was making an apples and oranges comparison. The $18,000 was his
equity contribution. The amount of cash he might need to successfully start up the
franchise was a different issue. Red Owl was eager to have him borrow sufficient cash to
avoid a cash flow crunch in the early months. Their point to him was that he had control
over this debt and if he did not need the additional cash he could retire any or all of it. See
infra text accompanying notes 65-66. It wasn't until the very end of the negotiations that
Red Owl learned that Hoffman was constrained by his father-in-law from incurring any
more debt. Record, supra note 13, at 141-44. Nevertheless, Hoffman's calculation was
also used by Hoffman's lawyers, accepted implicitly by defendants' counsel and by the
trial judge. As a result, the fundamental misunderstanding between Red Owl officials and
Hoffman was never made clear to the jury.
56 Record, supra note 13, at 223.
57 Id. at 145-46.
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Simon Vanden Heuvel would go into the franchise as equal partners. Vanden
Heuvel would contribute $13,000 in cash and Hoffman would contribute the
balance. 58
Before this new scheme had been vetted with Lukowitz, the Red Owl
home office people sent a third financing proposal in early December. This
plan reflected the additional $2000 needed for promotion. It showed
Hoffman's equity contribution unchanged at $22,100 ($4600 in cash and
$17,500 in bakery equipment). 59 In order to raise additional cash to operate the
store, the plan proposed a $8000 loan from the Chilton bank secured by
Hoffman's equity in the bakery equipment, a $7500 no pay, 5% interest loan
from his father-in-law, and a $6000 cash "profit" from the resale of the Chilton
lot to the builder.60 In short, Hoffman's cash contribution (borrowed funds
plus equity) had been increased by $2000 to $26,100 but the only change from
the previous plan was to increase the "profits" from selling the lot from $4000
to $6000.
Shortly after receiving this proposal, Hoffman called Lukowitz and told
him of the new arrangement he had made with Simon Vanden Heuvel to
secure $13,000. Lukowitz replied, "This is good. I'm sure that we can go
ahead at this point. '61 He then passed on this latest information to the Red Owl
front office in Minneapolis. Two days later, Lukowitz called to arrange a
meeting at the end of January with Carlson and Walker at the Red Owl store in
Appleton. Prior to that meeting Lukowitz and Hoffman met to discuss the new
arrangement in more detail. Upon learning of the terms for Vanden Heuvel's
contribution, Lukowitz suggested, "Let's not go into the partnership with the
front office. After it is all done, you can take your father-in-law in the way you
want." 62
E. The January 26 Financing Proposal
On January 26, 1962, Hoffman met Carlson, Walker, and Lukowitz at the
Appleton store. One of the Red Owl people said, "We are ready to go forward"
5 8 Id. at 147.
59 Exhibit 33, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie
County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.).
60 Id.
61 Record, supra note 13, at 149.
62 Id. at 186. Notwithstanding his trial testimony (which we must assume that the jury
believed), in deposition, Hoffman was asked: "To whom in the Red Owl organization did
you tell that your father-in-law had to be a partner?" Answer: "I don't know if I ever told
anybody." Id.
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and showed Hoffman a final financing proposal,63 one that addressed Red
Owl's continuing concerns about approving Hoffman for a franchise: the high
debt to equity ratio reflected in Hoffman's proposed contribution to the
enterprise. The solution was to have the $13,000 loan from Simon Vanden
Heuvel subordinated to general creditors. 64 Without a subordination
agreement, the $13,000 (whether considered an unsecured debt or a
contribution to equity) would have reduced Hoffman's equity contribution to
$9000. But with a subordination agreement in place, Hoffman's equity would
remain at $22,500 and his cash position would be significantly enhanced. The
additional $6000 from Simon together with a further proposed bank loan of
$2000 would increase the cash available to fund operations from $62,500 (as
reflected in the previous plan) to $70,500. This latest (and last) plan listed
Hoffman's equity contribution as essentially unchanged at $22,500, consisting
of $5000 in cash and $17,500 in bakery equipment.65
From Hoffman's perspective, however, this latest plan required $8000
more in borrowed funds, bringing to $34,000 the combined total of debt and
equity. He had two objections to the plan. The first revealed clearly the
divergence in the parties' understanding of the transaction: Hoffman felt that,
with the additional cash from his father-in-law and the new bank loan of $2000,
he should not be required to borrow $8000 from the Chilton Bank secured by
his equity in the bakery equipment. Frank Walker, the senior Red Owl officer,
attempted to reassure him that the additional $8000 in cash to begin operations
was for his benefit and was not an increase in his equity contribution. After all,
Hoffman had complete control over those borrowed funds. "It's your money"
Walker said, "It isn't ours." He tried again: "Joe, if after a reasonable length of
time these funds aren't used, pay them back to the bank."' 66 Hoffman was
adamant in reply, "My father-in-law won't let me be in debt." That was the end
of the meeting.
It seems plain, in retrospect, that Hoffman's real objection had to do with
his personal relationship with his father-in-law, who appears to have been a
prosperous, but stem, Calvinist. Hoffman could not borrow the $8000 from the
Chilton Bank because his father-in-law didn't believe in debt. He could not
propose to his father-in-law that his $13,000 contribution be subordinated to
creditors and treated legally as a gift because his father-in-law was sufficiently
63 Exhibit 34, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie
County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.).
64 Red Owl had prepared a subordination agreement that was also delivered to
Hoffman to be signed by his father-in-law. See Exhibit 46, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Pamell, J.).
65 Id.
66 Record, supra note 13, at 333.
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skeptical about Joe's business acumen that he wanted to have some control
over his money. As a consequence, despite Lukowitz' urging, Hoffman never
even asked his father-in-law to sign the proposed subordination agreement. He
returned home and called Walter Hall, the development officer, in
Minneapolis to complain. Hall admitted "this thing has gotten a little goofed
up." But when Hoffman asked "what about a smaller store," Hall replied "It's
this store or none and that's it ... .,"67 Finally, on February 2, 1962, Hoffman
wrote to Lukowitz:
After doing my utmost to put this together for 2 /2 years, it seems to me
Red Owls'[sic] demands have gotten beyond my power to fulfill. Therefore,
the only thing I can do at this time is drop the entire matter and try to make up
the losses I suffered, due to your ill-advice. 68
III. THE TRIAL
Joseph Hoffman's plan to "make up" for the losses he had incurred from
the failed negotiations with Red Owl officials was to consult legal counsel and
ultimately to sue Red Owl and Lukowitz for damages arising out of his
reliance on their representations made during the negotiation process. A year
and a half later, on October 21, 1963 at 9:30 a.m., trial began in the Circuit
Court of Outagamie County in the City of Appleton, Wisconsin. The presiding
judge was A.W. Parnell. Representing Joseph and Shirley Hoffman was G.H.
Van Hoof and John Wiley of the firm of Van Hoof& Van Hoof of Little Chute,
Wisconsin. Representing the defendants, Red Owl Stores, Inc. and Edward
Lukowitz, was David Fulton of the firm of Benton, Bosser, Fulton, Menn and
Nehs of Appleton.69
The word "promise" was not uttered during the trial. The plaintiffs' theory
of the case was that a representation made by the defendants on which
Hoffman reasonably relied to his detriment was actionable without more. As
Hoffman's attorney argued to the court following the conclusion of the trial:
"It is our position that if Mr. Hoffmann acts in reliance on any representations,
statements or misconduct, we don't care if it ever results in a final contract.
Our position is that they are then liable for damages, regardless, because they
have jockeyed him out of position." In response, the court replied:
I don't think what you are saying makes legal sense-if you will pardon
me. In other words, they had to make a material representation that if he
67 Id. at 156.
68 Exhibit 35, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie
County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.).
69 Record, supra note 13, at 77.
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would do certain things the end result would be they would give him a store
in Chilton. Unless there is a promise all the representations in the world
wouldn't make any difference.70 If they are dealing at arm's length, without
any eventual promise to do anything on the part of Red Owl, it doesn't make
any difference what they represented to him.7 1
Here was the big opening for Fulton, the defendants' lawyer, to press the
point that there were no grounds for misrepresentation liability whether in tort
or contract in the absence of a legal duty owed to the plaintiffs. In the absence
of a promise conditioned on such a misrepresentation there was no duty in
contract. Moreover, courts generally hold that there is no tort duty of care
owed to a commercial party engaged in arms length negotiations.7 2 Nor have
courts in the United States recognized a duty to bargain in good faith, much
less a duty to bargain carefully to avoid careless but non-willful
misrepresentations. Mistake, in other words, is relevant generally only if the
parties have already formed a contractual relationship.73
But Fulton, as he had throughout the trial, chose to rest on a single
argument: The negotiations were too indefinite to form a contract and absent a
contract there was no basis for liability. This might well have been true, but
Fulton did not educate the court as to why it was so. Nor did he try to narrow
the scope of the special verdict that permitted the jury to find liability based on
innocent misrepresentations that were relied upon. Thus, the issue of mutual
misunderstanding-that neither party knew or had reason to know the
meaning attached by the other to the representations about Hoffman's capital
contribution-was not put before the jury.
In consequence, the court prepared a special verdict that took the contract
question away from the jury but left them with the task of determining:
1) Were representations made by Red Owl officials that if Hoffman fulfilled
certain conditions a deal for a franchise store would be concluded? 2) Did
Hoffman reasonably rely on those representations? 3) Was it reasonable for
Hoffman to so rely? 4) Did Hoffman fulfill all the conditions required by the
terms of the negotiations? And 5) What sum of money would reasonably
compensate Hoffman for the sale of the Wautoma store, the bakery building,
the option on the lot, moving to Neenah and the rental of a house in Chilton?74
70 This is the only time in the entire proceedings that the word "promise" was spoken.
Id. at 439-40 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 439-40.
72 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 762 (1939).
73 There are exceptions, most notably the construction bid cases such as Drennan v.
Star Paving Co., 333 P. 2d 757 (Cal. 1958). See Mark P. Gergen, Mistake in Contract
Formation, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990).
74 Record, supra note 13, at 26-28.
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Subsequently, when instructing the jury, the court used the
subjective/objective test of reasonable reliance usually reserved for fraudulent
misrepresentation. Judge Parnell told the jury to determine the reasonableness
of Hoffman's reliance by taking into consideration Hoffman's experience, his
education, and all other circumstances. Thus, the question was not whether a
reasonable person would have so relied, but whether a person of like business
experience, knowledge, and background acting under the same circumstances
would have relied.75
Following the court's instructions, the jury retired at 12:06 p.m. to elect a
foreman and have lunch. They returned with their verdict at 4:27 p.m., having
eaten lunch and elected Abe Golden as foreman. The jury found for Hoffman
on all the specific questions and fixed damages at $140 for the moving
expenses, $125 for the house rental, $1000 for the option on the lot, $2000 for
the sale of the bakery building, and $16,735 for the sale of the Wautoma store.
Given that these items sum to $20,000, and given the short time for
deliberation, it seems plausible that the jury decided that $20,000 would be the
right amount to punish Red Owl for disrespecting one of their fellow citizens
and then simply designated the balance of the "damages" to losses arising
from the premature sale of the Wautoma store after making specific findings
on the other items. In any event, there was no evidence introduced that would
have supported the $16,735 figure reached by the jury.
Judge Parnell immediately questioned whether there was any evidentiary
basis for that finding and dismissed the jury with his thanks.76 The defendants'
filed a motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support Red Owl's liability and,
in the alternative, to reduce the awards for losses on the sale of the store and
bakery building to such sums as an unprejudiced jury could have awarded or,
in the alternative, to grant defendant a new trial on the issue of damages.
On March 16, 1964, Judge Parnell entered his order on the motion for
judgment. He affirmed the jury verdict in all respects save damages, in
particular the claimed losses in the sale of the Wautoma store. There he found
the award of $16,735 against the weight of the evidence, wholly without
foundation or support and contrary to the instructions of the court. Thus, he
ordered a new trial on the sole issue of damages for loss, if any, on the sale of
the Wautoma inventory and fixtures. Red Owl appealed the court's decision
affirming the jury verdict to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and Hoffman
75 Id. at 448-51.
76 There seems more than a little irony in his final statement to the jury that: "I know
that it has been a long and protracted case and called for considerable patience on your part,
and sacrifice and considerable effort, as is evidenced by the fact that you have been out all
afternoon on the verdict." Id. at 457.
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appealed that portion of the order that reversed the verdict on damages. 77
lV. THE APPEAL
A. The Appeal Briefs
Red Owl's brief to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin raised three
substantive issues. First, Red Owl argued there should be no recovery as a
matter of law in contract because, as found by the trial court, the statements
made by Red Owl representatives were preliminary negotiations and any
statements made during the negotiations were too uncertain or indefinite to be
the basis for finding an enforceable contract claim. Second, recovery could not
be had under a theory of estoppel in pais because, under Wisconsin law,
equitable estoppel can be used only as a shield-to prevent the defendant from
denying that a particular fact is true-and not as a sword to create a right of
recovery that does not exist in the first instance. Third, the plaintiff could not
recover on the basis of promissory estoppel because there were no-
representations definite enough to qualify as "promises" within Restatement
Section 90 and, in any event, plaintiff suffered no injustice because the reason
the deal fell through was Hoffman's refusal to present the subordination issue
to his father-in-law. 78
In response, Hoffman's lawyers primarily rested their case, as they had at
trial, on the theory of equitable estoppel. They argued that, in light of the
misrepresentations of its agents, Red Owl was estopped from claiming that
there was no contract. 79 They also argued for an implied-in-fact contract on
the grounds that Hoffman would not have done the things he did had there not
been a contract to award him the store.80 Finally, they claimed a right to
damages on the basis of promissory estoppel, simply ignoring the appellant's
argument that promissory estoppel is available where there is a promise but no
consideration, but is not available when there is no promise in the first place.81
77 Red Owl perfected its appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin from the Order on
Motions after Verdict on June 25, 1964.
78 Appellant's Brief, supra note 12, at 31-52. With respect to damages, Red Owl
claimed that the award of $16,735 was reached by merely subtracting awards for moving
expenses, rent of a house in Neenah, sale of the bakery building, and option on the lot, from
a gross figure of $20,000, demonstrating that the jury pulled the figure out of the air. There
was no evidence of loss of bargain in the June sale of the grocery business and thus it was
in error to remand for a new trial.
79 Brief of the Appellees, Appendix at 23, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. and
Edward Lukowitz, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (No. 147).
80 Id. at 19-20.
81 With respect to the promissory estoppel claim, the appellee's brief simply quoted
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B. The Decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Currie ignored the issue of
equitable estoppel and focused exclusively on the promissory estoppel
argument. The Court asked: Should the doctrine of promissory estoppel as
embodied in Restatement Section 90 be recognized and, if so, is it satisfied
here? The court held that this issue was squarely presented since "no other
possible theory has been presented to or discovered by this court which would
permit plaintiffs to recover." 82 Promissory fraud was the only other possible
theory the court could imagine might cover this case, but the court held that
such action would not lie absent a present intent by Red Owl not to fulfill a
promise at the time it was made. The court rejected the possibility that Red
Owl had made any of its "promises" in bad faith or with a present intent not to
perform.
Turning then to Section 90, the court endorsed and adopted the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and found ample evidence of all of its elements to support
the jury verdict. Indeed, the court identified a number of "promises and
assurances" made by Red Owl representatives, the foremost being the promise
by Lukowitz "that for the sum of $18,000 Red Owl would establish Hoffman
in a store." 83 The court adopted Hoffman's claim that, after the store was sold
and the lot purchased, the $18,000 figure was changed to $24,100, then
increased to $26,100 with the assurance that the deal would go through, then
Hoffman was induced to sell his bakery building on the assurance that this was
the last necessary step but instead the figure was increased yet again to
$34,000. Based on these findings, the court concluded that there was ample
evidence to sustain the jury's findings that the promissory representations
made by Red Owl were reasonably relied upon by Hoffman to his detriment.
The court then turned to the central question raised by Red Owl on
appeal-that the representations made by Lukowitz were simply too uncertain
from RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 Ill. 3 (1932) that if "A promises B that if
B will go to college and complete his course he will give him $5000 and B does so: Then
A's promise is binding." Id. at 24.
82 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Wis. 1965). Given that the
plaintiff's primary theory at trial and on appeal was equitable estoppel, this is a most
peculiar statement, only exceeded by the following: "the trial court frame[d] the special
verdict on the theory of sec. 90 of the Restatement." Id. In fact, the word "promise" was
never uttered during the trial testimony or in the court's instructions to the jury, not to
mention "§ 90" or "promissory estoppel."
83 Id. at 274. This statement by the court is not supported by the record, even as it was
edited for the appeal. Hoffman testified only that Lukowitz assured him that $18,000 was a
sufficient amount to secure a franchise. There was no testimony that Lukowitz ever said
that in return for an $18,000 contribution "he would establish Hoffman in a store."
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and indefinite to form the basis of contract liability. Under the indefiniteness
doctrine, a representation does not qualify as a promise if the undertaking is
uncertain or unclear or if key material facts essential to that undertaking have
not been specified. The court conceded that many factors were never agreed
upon, including the design, layout, and cost of the store, who the builder would
be, the price the builder would pay for the land and the resulting rental, the
term of the franchise, and the renewal and purchase options. All of these
considerations are what led the trial court to conclude as a matter of law that
the parties' negotiations were preliminary and could not form the basis for a
contract. But, the appellate court held, a promise sufficient to sustain a claim in
promissory estoppel need not be the equivalent of an offer that would result in
a binding contract if accepted.84
Finally, the court turned to the issue of damages and here it affirmed the
trial court's order of a new trial on the issue of damages for the premature sale
of the Wautoma store. The court held that because recovery was had under
Section 90, Hoffman's damages should not exceed his actual reliance losses
suffered by the sale and thus the evidence did not sustain the $16,735 jury
award.
V. THE HOFFMAN SAGA AS A CAUTIONARY TALE
Even with the facts as found by the court, grounding Red Owl's liability
on a promissory estoppel theory is untenable as a matter of contract doctrine.
There is scant support in the law of contracts for the court's legal analysis. To
the contrary, the Restatement of Contracts has only one definition of a promise,
and that definition applies equally to a promise that is the product of a
bargained-for-exchange and a promise for which enforcement is sought on the
grounds of induced reliance. 85 The doctrine of indefiniteness holds that, for a
representation to qualify as a promise, it must be sufficiently clear and definite
that it justifies the promisee in believing that a commitment has been made. If
the terms of a manifestation of intent are uncertain or indefinite, then, by
definition, it fails to qualify as a promise.86 If neither party has made a promise,
84 Specifically, the court held that: "sec. 90 of [the] Restatement... does not impose
the requirement that the promise giving rise to the cause of action must be so
comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer that would ripen into a
contract if accepted by the promisee." Id. at 275.
85 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 2, 90 (1981). RESTATEMENT
§ 2 defines apromise as a manifestation of an intention to be bound so made that it justifies
the promisee in believing a commitment has been made. RESTATEMENT § 90 begins "A
promise .... and defines it by reference to § 2. See id. § 90 reporter's note cmt. a
(emphasis added).
86 Id. § 33.
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there is no claim under Section 90. Rather, the parties' initial communications
to each other fall in the category of unenforceable preliminary negotiations.
Thus, if Hoffman stands for the proposition that a commitment can be binding
under a theory of promissory estoppel even though it lacks the clarity and
certainty required of a bargained-for promise, the case is wrong as a matter of
contract doctrine.
A. Are There Any Theories on Which Liability Could Be Based?
Some scholars have suggested that the opinion in Hoffman can be
grounded on a duty to negotiate in good faith.87 Putting aside the difficulties
inherent in applying such a standard, there is simply no evidence of any bad
faith by any of the Red Owl officials. At most, Lukowitz was careless in his
initial representation because he did not inquire further as to what Hoffman
meant by his statement that he had about $18,000 to contribute. But, if
anything, Hoffman was much more careless. Certainly, he could see by
September 1961, when he was handed a proposed financing plan, that what he
was to contribute was "equity" of at least $18,000. While the proposed cash
requirements for the franchise did increase over time, the equity requirements
remained largely fixed and the additional proposals for cash were loans that
Hoffman was free to repay if he didn't need the cash flow for his grocery
business. 88
Moreover, Red Owl's continued insistence that Hoffman make a
substantial equity contribution to the franchise reflects perfectly appropriate
business judgment. The risk in any franchise contract is that the interests of the
parties will be misaligned and, as a consequence, the franchisee may manage
its operation in a manner inconsistent with the interests of the franchisor. A
widely recognized conflict that arises with excessive debt financing is that the
agent may be motivated to increase the riskiness of his management of the
franchise. By "putting all his eggs in one basket," the agent can gamble with
the borrowed funds. If the venture is successful, all the returns in excess of the
fixed debt accrue to the agent. But, if the venture fails, the agent shares the loss
87 See, e.g., Duhl, supra note 7, at 315-21; P. S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND
LAW 80-92 (1981); Knapp, supra note 7, at 686-90; Summers, supra note 7, at 225.
88 Red Owl was appropriately concerned that Hoffman have sufficient cash on hand to
begin operations, because a failure of a new franchise store would adversely affect the Red
Owl brand. Lukowitz testified that the proposed increase in cash reflected in the January
financing plan was prompted by Red Owl's experience in opening new franchises and
finding that additional cash was often needed to "get them off the ground, especially if you
are new in a location." This additional cash was intended "for the protection of the
operator." Record, supra note 13, at 307.
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with his creditors. 89 Red Owl, therefore, was properly concerned about
avoiding this problem by working toward a jointly beneficial financing plan,
one that protected its brand name from the possibility that its value would be
diluted by Hoffman's risky business decisions.
Mark Gergen and others have suggested that the best theory of liability is
negligent misrepresentation. 90 But there are many problems applying this
theory to arm's length bargaining contexts. Many courts don't recognize this
tort at all 91 and the Restatement rule requires that the party making the
statement owe a duty to the plaintiff to supply correct information to him.92
Because casual statements and contacts are prevalent in business, under the
majority rule in commercial contexts, liability for negligent misrepresentation
is imposed only where the party making the statement possesses unique or
specialized expertise or is in a special position of trust and confidence with the
injured party such that reliance on the negligent misrepresentation is
justified.93 It has been specifically held, for example, that a franchisee could
not maintain an action for negligent misrepresentation where the franchisor
was not in a business of supplying information. 94 Moreover, a claim for
negligent misrepresentation ordinarily cannot be based on unfulfilled
promises or statements as to future events. Finally, recovery of purely
economic loss for negligent misrepresentation is available only when there is a
special relationship between the parties or when the representation is made by
one in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others. 95
89 For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 901, 919-22 (1986).
90 See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 73, at 34-36 (Hoffnan best explained as liability for
negligent misrepresentation); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 24 (1981) (same).
91 See, e.g., Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1349-50 (E.D. Va.
1987) (applying Virginia law).
92 Under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977), an action for negligent
misrepresentation lies only against one "who, in the course of his business profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions." Id.
93 See, e.g., Eternity Global Master Fund, Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of NY, 375
F.3d 168, 187 (2d Cir. 2004). Thus, many courts hold there is no tort of negligent
misrepresentation in the vendor/purchaser context. The key to the tort is that the plaintiff
must allege and prove that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff to communicate
accurate information. Thus, the plaintiff must show that the defendant either was in the
business of supplying information or that the defendant had a pecuniary interest in the
plaintiffs transaction with a third party. Continental Leavitt Commc'ns, Ltd. v. Paine
Webber, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo,
844 F.2d 56, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1988).
94 Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 867, 887 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
95 Gebrayel v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 888 P.2d 83, 89 (Or. Ct. App. 1995);
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A final theory of liability is recovery in quasi-contract for unjust
enrichment. Here the argument would be that Hoffman conferred a benefit on
Red Owl during the period from May through November when he purchased
and then sold his grocery store, sold the bakery building, and purchased an
option on the lot in Chilton. All these actions gave Red Owl some further
indication of the kind of franchisee that Hoffman was likely to be-was he
enterprising and resourceful or was he a bit of a doofus? Quasi-contract claims
based on unjust enrichment rarely succeed, however, unless the defendant
specifically and wrongfully induced the benefit. A quasi-contract claim does
not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of
others, but instead "it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the
sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully."96 This at
least puts the key question to a court: Was Hoffman induced to provide
information to Red Owl by trick or was he a "mere volunteer"?
The trial transcript strongly suggests that Lukowitz was trying to mediate
between Hoffman's meager capital assets and the home office's capital
requirements. The facts as found by the court show only that Lukowitz was
eager to secure a franchise for Hoffman, no doubt because he would earn a
commission if the deal went through. The steps that he urged Hoffman to
take-selling the store, buying the lot, and moving to Neenah-all seem
designed to accelerate the approval process, not to induce an un-bargained-for
benefit for Red Owl. Under the circumstances, then, shouldn't Hoffman have
been more cautious in nailing down exactly how much capital he would have
to provide prior to buying the grocery store, selling the store, selling his bakery,
and buying an option on a lot?
Jason Johnston has argued that Red Owl might properly be held liable if
the facts showed that Red Owl had a low opinion of Hoffman's prospects as a
franchisee but hid that fact from Hoffman and instead encouraged his
subsequent actions to see whether-against the odds-he turned out to have
better talents than they initially believed. 97 The problem with this argument is
Continental, 857 F. Supp. at 1270.
96 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of St. Paul v. Ramier, 311 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Minn. 1981);
Fimon v. Kenroc Drywall Supplies, Inc., No. C7-02-1588, 203 Minn. App. LEXIS 311, at
*1, *11-12 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2003).
97 Johnston, supra note 7, at 496-99 (suggesting that Red Owl should be found liable
if it misrepresented its relative optimism about the deal in order to learn more about
Hoffman as a potential manager). A variant of this argument is offered by Ofer Grosskopf
and Barak Medina in their interesting article, Regulating Contract Formation:
Precontractual Reliance, Sunk Costs, and Market Structure, 39 CONN. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2007). They argue that the Hoffmans, being inexperienced and naive,
underappreciated the risk of failed negotiations and thus over-invested in precontractual
reliance. Red Owl, as an experienced repeat player, should have been conscious of this risk
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that the facts simply belie that story. The evidence shows that Red Owl
officials worked hard to find a way to stretch what they discovered to be
Hoffman's meager capital so as to make the franchise deal work. The series of
financial proposals from September 1961 to January 1962 were motivated less
by Red Owl's escalating financial requirement than by Hoffman's frequent
shifting of his capital. That the deal broke down is more a function of the thin
margin on which Hoffman was operating than any attempt by Red Owl to
disguise its pessimism about the proposed transaction.
B. What About "Fundamental Fairness"?
But, as others have noted, there is a highly salient aspect to the Hoffman
story-the evident disparity in income, education, and business acumen
between Joe Hoffman and the Red Owl corporate officers. Is Hoffman v. Red
Owl simply a case about fundamental fairness-one where the search for a
strong doctrinal justification for liability is beside the point? In Peter Linzer's
words, this may be a case for "rough justice" and not for doctrinal niceties. 98
The story of the hometown "little guy" pitted against a large, impersonal, and
out-of-state corporation certainly seems the best explanation for the jury
verdict, but more, surely, is required from the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And,
the truth is that the facts as revealed at trial simply do not support the fairness
claim. Nowhere in the record, for example, is there any testimony that
Lukowitz said what was attributed to him by the Wisconsin court, nor were
Hoffman's proposed equity contributions ever substantially increased as the
court implied.
The testimony is that Hoffman said to Lukowitz and his associate at the
May 1961 meeting, "Fellows, you know how much money I
got-approximately $18,000. Will this put me in a bigger operation or won't
it?" And Lukowitz then replied, "there would be no problem."99 At most this
is a representation that $18,000 of capital is enough for one to be established in
a store assuming all other details are ironed out. In addition, the capital
requirements for Hoffman were not increased in the manner the court suggests.
As indicated earlier, Hoffman's proposed equity contribution changed from
$18,600 in the first financial proposal in September to $22,100 in the second
proposal in November. This change was apparently motivated by the fact that
and taken steps to prevent it. Holding Red Owl liable for Hoffman's reliance costs
motivates it to prevent such unwarranted investment. Id. Apart from the fact that this
solution would seem to have negative effects on activity levels (such as chilling
negotiations with prospective franchisees who are behaviorally impaired), as with
Johnston's argument, the theory simply doesn't fit the facts.
98 Linzer, supra note 7, at 719-20.
99 Record, supra note 13, at 86.
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the bakery building was encumbered (contrary to Hoffman's initial
representation) and the resulting need to shift the focus of Hoffman's proposed
equity contribution to the bakery equipment. Thereafter, Hoffman's equity
contribution remained essentially unchanged through the third and fourth
financing proposals in December and January.
To be sure, Lukowitz did make two subsequent assurances-that with the
additional $2,000 in promotion "the deal would go through," and that the sale
of the bakery building in November "was the last step." But these statements
were all made after the September meeting between Hoffman and Carlson and
Hall from the home office. By that time, Hoffman knew well that their
approval and not Lukowitz's was the key to securing the franchise. Given
these facts, the question is not whether Hoffman was exploited by corporate
barons (Lukowitz, after all, had less education than he did).' 00 The real issue
was whether Hoffman's understanding of the transaction was a reasonable one
and, more importantly, was it the only reasonable one.
At the end of the day, imposing liability for precontractual reliance
because one party failed to correct the other's misunderstanding has
significant costs, especially if one believes that, ordinarily, precontractual
negotiations are essentially truthful. Jason Johnston has argued persuasively
that such "cheap talk" should not be subject to liability in the ordinary case
because delay in reaching a deal is costly to the parties and thus negotiators
already have incentives to communicate useful information.' 0 ' There may be
sound reasons to accept the costs of chilling future negotiations in order to
prevent exploitation of the weak by the strong, but there is scant evidence of
any exploitation in the negotiations between Joseph Hoffman and the
representatives of Red Owl Stores.
C. Lawyering Matters: Arguments That Red Owl Failed to Pursue
One lesson from a close review of the Hoffman case is that the quality of
legal argument matters. The record of the case reveals much to criticize about
the way Red Owl's attorneys defended their clients. 10 2 In particular, they
100 Lukowitz had a high school degree; Hoffman had a year of business and
management courses at a local business college. Id. at 78.
101 Johnston, supra note 7, at 407-11.
102 Among other dubious trial tactics, Red Owl's attorneys apparently responded to
the plaintiffs' request to call Carlson, Hall, and Walker as adverse witnesses by instructing
the Red Owl home office personnel not to be present in court during the plaintiffs' case in
chief. Thus, the following colloquy occurred in the presence of the jury:
Mr. Van Hoof (Hoffman's attorney): I would like to call Mr. Carlson adversely.
Mr. Fulton (Red Owl's attorney): Carlson is not present.
Mr. Van Hoof: I would like to call Mr. Walker adversely.
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failed to raise three issues, either at trial or on appeal, that seem quite cogent
given the trial testimony. First, did Lukowitz have apparent authority to make
financial representations? This question is particularly important once the
chronology is clear. According to Hoffman, Lukowitz made his first
representation in May when he assured Hoffman that $18,000 would be
sufficient capital to put him in a bigger store. In September, Hoffman met with
Carlson and Hall and, by then, he was aware that they were the parties who
would negotiate the financial terms of the transaction. 10 3 In the interim, the
only actions Hoffman plausibly took in reliance on the Lukowitz assurance
were the sale of the grocery business in June and the purchase of the option on
the lot in Chilton in September. But the moving expenses, the house rental in
Neenah, and the sale of the bakery building all occurred subsequently. There is
no testimony that either Hall or Carlson made any similar representations to
Hoffman. Thus, the one representation which Hoffman might reasonably
assume Lukowitz was authorized to make was the initial assurance in May
regarding the minimum "capital" requirements for a franchise, and, as
suggested earlier, the parties attached different meanings to this assurance.
Second, was Hoffman's reliance reasonable? At the September meeting
with Hall and Carlson, and thereafter until he broke off negotiations, Hoffman
never asked the Red Owl home office people to confirm his understanding
about the source of funds for his contribution or to explain what Red Owl
meant by its assurance that $18,000 would be a sufficient capital investment.
This silence is all the more puzzling because Hoffman saw four different
financing proposals, each of which specifically listed "Equity Capital
(Amount owner has to invest)" as a separate line item apart from "Loans." 104
To be sure, the reasonableness of Hoffman's reliance was a question of fact for
Mr. Fulton: He is not present.
Mr. Van Hoof: I would like to call Mr. Hall adversely.
Mr. Fulton: He is not present.
The Court: Did you make a request to have them present?
Mr. Van Hoof: They are out-of-state, and I couldn't subpoena them.
Record, supra note 13, at 344-45.
It is hard to imagine any more powerful way in which Hoffman's attorney could have
emphasized to the jury that this was a case of a native son of Wisconsin who was in a
dispute with out-of-state corporate big-wigs who were too busy to even show up to hear
what Hoffman had to say.
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 136(1) (1958) provides that an agent's
apparent authority is terminated "(a) when the principal states such a fact to the third
person." Thus, the key question was whether Hall and Carlson indicated directly or
indirectly to Hoffman that Lukowitz had no authority to make financial representations on
behalf of Red Owl. Clearly, Hoffman had reason to know that this was so.
104 See Exhibits 32, 33, 34 and 39, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis.
Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.).
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the jury. But recall that the trial court instructed the jury on the
subjective/objective test of reasonable reliance, one that required the jury to
assess Hoffman's behavior against the standard of a person with similar
education, business experience, and acumen rather than the purely objective
standard of the reasonable person. This more forgiving test of reasonable
behavior is properly applied to fraud, duress, and other intentional acts, but not
to a promissory estoppel or a negligence tort theory of the case. Thus, Red
Owl's attorneys had an opportunity to object to that instruction and thereby
challenge the reasonableness of Hoffman's behavior on appeal.
Third, and most important, the transcript makes clear that the parties never
had a mutual understanding about the meaning of the statement: "I have
approximately $18,000-will this put me in a bigger operation or won't it?"
The Red Owl representatives clearly meant that he would have to contribute
equity of at least that amount and Hoffman clearly was focusing on how much
cash he would put into the transaction, whether borrowed or not. Who is
responsible for Hoffman's misunderstanding about the assurance that $18,000
of capital would be sufficient? The rule in contract negotiations is that each
party is responsible for clarifying his understanding of the meaning the other
attaches to ambiguous words and phrases, and this rule would strongly argue
against liability in this case. 105 While the appellants' brief does point out that
this ambiguity was unresolved, Red Owl's attorneys failed to tie this apparent
misunderstanding to any legal conclusion and they raised the point only to
show that the negotiations were ongoing and indefinite.
One shouldn't be too hard on the attorneys for Red Owl, however. From
their perspective there was no theory on which liability could properly be
based as the law existed at the time. There was no justifiable claim for breach
of a bargain contract because the representations were too indefinite to be a
promissory commitment. For the same reason, liability could not properly be
based on promissory estoppel. Equitable estoppel was inappropriate under
Wisconsin law as it could not be used to create a right where none previously
existed. And, there was then no cause of action in Wisconsin for negligent
misrepresentation. Where Red Owl's lawyers failed, from the outset, was to
present their clients' behavior and actions in a reasonable and defensible light.
They could and should have elicited testimony about how hard everyone
worked to make the negotiations succeed, and how it came to naught
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(1) (1981) provides:
There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach
materially different meanings to their manifestations and (a) neither party knows or
has reason to know the meaning attached by the other; or (b) each party knows or each
party has reason to know the meaning attached by the other.
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ultimately because of Hoffman's personal constraints. He needed Simon
Vanden Heuvel's money to make the deal work and yet those funds came with
strings attached that ultimately undermined the deal.
D. Epilogue
How was this dispute resolved and what happened to Joseph Hoffman?
Professor Stewart Macaulay and his colleagues report that the parties settled
the case for $10,600. Of that sum, $4000 went for attorney's fees and the
Hoffmans retained the balance. Joseph Hoffman, meanwhile, became a very
successful insurance salesman, winning several awards for sales volume. He
and his family ultimately moved to Milwaukee where he rose through the
ranks of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to become District
Manager.' 0 6 Thereafter, he was transferred to Indiana and remained with the
company in a managerial capacity. Finally, why was Hoffman so restless and
eager to escape the bakery business in the first place? Grant Gilmore reported
some years ago that Hoffman's motivations may have been largely
independent of Red Owl's representations: the poor fellow, he told me, was
allergic to bread!
VI. WHITHER THE LAW OF PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS AND
PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS?
How do contemporary American courts actually treat reliance investments
made before the parties have written a complete contract? Alan Schwartz and I
report the results of a study of recent litigation in a forthcoming article. 10 7 We
began with a sample of 105 cases litigated between 1999 and 2003.108 Thirty
of the cases raised the issue of reliance in the context of on-going negotiations.
The underlying question in each case was whether the plaintiff could recover
reliance costs if the parties had not yet reached any agreement. The courts
denied liability, whether premised on promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, or
negligent misrepresentation, in eighty-seven percent of these preliminary
negotiation cases. The case data thus show that, absent intentional
106 MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 6, at 403-04.
107 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007).
108 We examined all public databases for preliminary negotiation and preliminary
agreement cases proceeding under the following theories of liability: promissory estoppel,
quantum meruit, implied contract, definiteness, and intent to be bound. The final sample of
105 relevant cases represented 29 state jurisdictions, 19 federal district courts, and 7
federal courts of appeal.
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misrepresentation or deceit, there is generally no liability for reliance
investments made during the negotiation process. 10 9
In sum, courts will not grant recovery for "early reliance" unless the
parties, by agreeing on something significant, have indicated their intention to
be bound. Put more directly, the cases do not revolve around preliminary
negotiations, but rather around preliminary agreements. Thus, for example, in
the remaining seventy-five cases in our sample, the parties had agreed on at
least some material terms. In twenty-seven cases, the court denied recovery,
even though the parties had reached agreement on some (or even most) terms,
because the parties had indicated, either expressly or by implication, that they
did not yet intend to be legally bound. In thirty-six cases, the court held that the
parties could have been found to have made a complete contract, even though
they contemplated a further memorialization of terms, because the evidence
showed that the formal writing was not essential. Finally, and most interesting,
in twelve cases involving agreements to agree, the court found a binding
preliminary agreement to negotiate further in good faith. These latter cases are
interesting because they are at the forefront of an emerging rule governing
preliminary agreements.
The common law has historically had great difficulty with preliminary
agreements that expressed a mutual commitment on agreed terms but where
significant additional terms remained to be negotiated. Typically, parties have
agreed to negotiate further over the remaining terms. These "agreements to
agree" confront the indefiniteness doctrine head on. Until recently, courts have
held consistently that such "agreements to agree" were unenforceable under
the common law of contracts so long as any essential term was open to
negotiation. 10 The cases in our sample thus reflect a major shift in doctrine
involving agreements to agree where key terms remain unresolved. The
modern framework for determining intent in agreements to agree (as well as
cases dealing with the timing of enforcement) was first proposed by Judge
Pierre Leval in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v.
Tribune Co. I I The Leval framework has subsequently been adopted by the
109 "It is fundamental to contract law that mere participation in negotiations and
discussions does not create binding obligation, even if agreement is reached on all disputed
terms. More is needed than agreement on each detail, which is overall agreement... to
enter into the binding contract." Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670
F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d
257, 264 (2d Cir. 1984).
110 ScoTT & KRAUs, supra note 6, at 34-44, 322-25. Agreements to agree on the
price in sales contracts are enforceable under the Uniform Commercial Code if the parties
evidence an intention to be bound. See U.C.C. § 2-305(l)(b) (2003).
111 670 F. Supp. at 491.
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Second Circuit, 1 2 and is now followed in at least thirteen states, sixteen
federal district courts, and seven federal circuits.1 13 The framework sets out a
new default rule for cases where the parties contemplate further negotiations.
This rule relaxes the knife-edge character of the common law under which
agreements are either fully enforceable or not enforceable at all. 114
Leval's framework relies on two distinct categories of preliminary
agreements that will have binding force. The first (Type I) is a fully binding
preliminary agreement. Here the parties agree on all the terms that require
negotiation (including whether to be bound) but agree to memorialize their
agreement in a more formal document. A Type I agreement binds both sides to
their ultimate contractual objective just as if it were a formalized agreement,
because the signing of a more elaborate contract is seen only as a formality.
Thus, either party may demand performance of the transaction even though the
parties fail to produce the more elaborate documentation of their agreement."15
The second and more interesting type of preliminary agreement (Type II)
is a binding preliminary commitment which is created when the parties have
reached agreement on certain major terms of the deal but leave other terms
open for further negotiation. The parties to such an understanding "accept a
mutual commitment to negotiate together in good faith in an effort to reach
final agreement." 116 Neither party, however, has a right to demand
performance of the transaction. Rather, they have a legal obligation to attempt
to negotiate the open issues in good faith within the agreed framework. If a
final contract is not agreed upon, the parties may abandon the transaction. Our
sample shows that the enforcement of these binding preliminary agreements is
now well-accepted. Indeed, a federal court recently declared the enforcement
of such agreements as "the modem trend in contract law." 117
The preceding discussion demonstrates that scholars interested in
commercial contracting should shift their focus from the largely irrelevant
issue of precontractual reliance to the fundamental questions raised by the
enforcement of these preliminary agreements. The emerging rule requires
courts to resolve two key questions. When have the parties reached "an
112 Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 547-48 (2d Cir.
1998).
113 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 107, at 664.
114.4djustrite, 145 F.3d at 548; see also R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751
F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1984).
115 Adjustrite, 145 F.3d at 548.; Gorodensky v. Mitsubishi Pulp Sales Inc., 92 F. Supp.
2d 249, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
116 Teachers, 670 F. Supp. at 498.
117 Beazer Homes Corp. v. VMIF/Anden Southbridge Venture, 235 F. Supp. 2d 485,
491 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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agreement" sufficient to impose a duty to negotiate in good faith? And, what
behavior constitutes a breach of that duty? The current framework fails to
provide much guidance in answering these questions. 118
Indeed, we can't answer the legal questions until we first understand better
the commercial behavior that has generated this litigation. The sheer volume
of litigation over these preliminary agreements exposes a deep puzzle. Parties
often write fully binding contracts before they invest in reliance. And, when
they need to invest early prior to final contract they can (and do) contract
directly on reliance. Yet these parties invest prior to final contract and they fail
to contract specifically on reliance. Why do parties put themselves in this
situation? And, finally, when negotiations break down and one party exits,
when would the other party have a reasonable expectation of compensation
absent an explicit promise to reimburse reliance expenditures? Schwartz and
Scott provide one answer to this question, 119 but the academic debate over the
law of preliminary agreements is only just beginning. The delay in
understanding this important and heretofore largely ignored area of
commercial law is attributable, at least in part, to the myth of precontractual
reliance and the unfortunate case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.
118 The multifactored character of the Leval test confines the court's discretion more
than a broad standard based on intent. But so long as the courts do not attach weights to the
factors or otherwise specify the relationship between them, the factors may point in
different directions and thus the test will lack transparency.
119 Schwartz and Scott argue that the duty to bargain in good faith arises where one
party promises to make a simultaneous investment prior to negotiating the remaining terms
and thereafter delays its investment strategically. Under those circumstances, they argue
that the party who invested first should be entitled to recover its reliance costs and a failure
by the delaying party to bargain over the amount of those costs would qualify as a breach of
the duty. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 107, at 666-67.
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